STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 24, 1975

Mr. James V. Guffey, Secretary
Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs
State Capitol Building
Pierre, South Dakota 57501

OFFICIAL OPINION NO. 75-119

Waiver of supplemental coverage; SDCL 58-23-7

Dear Mr. Guffey:

On June 10, 1975, this office received a request for an opinion from Mr. Penn Williams of the Division of Insurance concerning the waiving of supplemental coverages as per SDCL 58-23-7. The question asked by Mr. Williams is of sufficient statewide concern so as it is my policy this opinion is addressed to you as Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs.

SDCL 58-23-7 reads as follows:

No application for an automobile liability policy may be taken with respect to any automobile registered or principally garaged in this state unless the supplemental coverages set forth in SDCL 58-23-8 are offered to the named insured who shall have the right to reject in writing all or anyone or more of such coverages. (Emphasis added.)

A headnote prepared by the South Dakota Supreme Court in Landauer v. Conklin, 3 S.D. 462, 52 N.W. 322 reads as follows:

A fundamental rule of interpretation applied to statutes, mandatory as well as directory, is that words in a statute, if of common use, are to be taken in their natural and ordinary sense, without any forced or subtle construction either to limit or extend their import.

Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 76 said: "The intention of the Legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. "

Again our Supreme Court in Ex parte Brown, 21 S.D. 515, 114 N.W., 303 (1907) said: "While it is the duty of the court to seek for and give effect to the meaning of the lawmakers, its research must not extend beyond legislative language when couched in words that are free from any ambiguity. "

Applying the above rules of statutory construction to SDCL 58-23-8 and specifically the phrase "who shall have the right to reject in writing," the legislative intent is clear. There is no ambiguity in the phrase referred to above, and the words in the phrase taken in their natural and ordinary sense, require that we only interpret the statute and not look to legislative intent.

It is my opinion that the plain meaning of the words "in writing" requires that the rejection be in such form. The statute does not allow for oral rejection and one cannot extend or force any other interpretation on a statute free from ambiguity.

Respectfully submitted,

William Janklow
Attorney General

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