December 14, 1981

Mr. Robert Arneson 
Hamlin County State's Attorney 
Hamlin County Courthouse 
Hayti, South Dakota 57241

Official Opinion No. 81-47

The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on the Closing Hours of Alcoholic Beverages Establishments

Dear Mr. Arneson:

You have requested an official opinion from this office in regard to the following factual situation:

FACTS: 

At 2:05 a.m., CDT, Sunday, October 25, 1981, a chief of police in one of our Hamlin County municipalities entered a local on-sale liquor establishment in the municipality and discovered that liquor was being dispensed and consumed at that time, such dispensing and consuming having continued throughout the previous evening and up until 2:55 a.m. CDT that morning. 

As you know, the advanced time (daylight saving time) ended at 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, October 25, 1981. 

The chief of police has appeared at my office for the purpose of signing a criminal complaint against the on-sale establishment for serving and allowing to be consumed alcoholic beverages after hours.

Based on the above facts you have asked the following question:

QUESTION: 

Is an on-sale establishment legally entitled to serve alcoholic beverages during that extra hour on the last Sunday in October when the advanced time (daylight saving time) expires?

On April 1, 1967, the Uniform Time Act of 1966, P.L. 89-387, 80 Stat. 107, 15 U.S.C. 260  became effective.  Subsection A of that act provides: 

During the period commencing at 2:00 antimeridian on the last Sunday of April each year and ending at 2:00 antimeridian on the last Sunday of October of each year, the standard time of eachzone established by the act of March 19, 1918, 15 U.S.C. 261-264 as modified . . . shall be advanced one hour and such time as so modified . . . be the standard time of such zone during such period . . .

That section goes on to provide certain exemptions by states wishing to take themselves out of the act which has not occurred in South Dakota.

Section B of the act declares: 

It is the express intent of Congress by this section to supersede any and all laws of the states or political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter provide for advances in time or changeover dates different from those specified in this section.

The practical effect of this statute is that on the commencement of advanced time (that is 2:00 antimeridian) on the last Sunday in April and advancement of one hour, the time becomes 3:00 a.m. Likewise, at 2:00 antimeridian on the last Sunday of October, the advanced time terminates and standard time resumes.  The practical effect of this is that at the resumption of standard time the clock will show 1:00 a.m. as it would have had the advanced time not taken place on the last Sunday of the preceding April.  There exists, therefore, a problem  with the statement of facts inasmuch as there can be no such thing as 2:05 a.m. CDT, Sunday, October 25, 1981, as CDT terminated at 2:00 a.m.

In an earlier opinion of this office, 1941-42 A.G.R. 377, my predecessor discusses the matter of the standard of time adopted by Congress particularly with reference to the conduct of business in intoxicating liquors, and whether or not a person may serve the same based upon local time standards or must change the time and close the business one hour earlier under the Federal act.  The Attorney General concluded 'that beginning at 2 o'clock antimeridian on February 9, 1942, and continuing for the period provided . . . the standard of time throughout this state shall be one hour advanced, and that all designations of time occurring in any statute, city ordinance, court record, deed, or other contract, or other legal instrument, or proceeding, shall be regulated thereby, and when by law or process of any authority created pursuant to law, an act must be performed at or within such prescribed time.'

Since upon the termination of the advanced hour the time returns to its standard non-advanced condition, the alcoholic beverage licensee would be able to carry on his business in the same manner with respect to closing hours as he did prior to the last Sunday of the preceding April.  It is my opinion, therefore, that the times referred to in SDCL 35-4-81 mean the current time as indicated on a clock which has been properly adjusted in conformance with the Uniform Time Act and that so long as the establishment then conforms to  that standard, no violation of the alcoholic beverage statutes would occur.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark V. Meierhenry
Attorney General